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outcome, and the recent Hans Island resolution highlights the promise of the ICJ model for the Arctic
region. As noted earlier in this discussion, the resistance such a policy shift would face from great
powers in the region would be considerable, but this structural challenge should not strike the idea
from the policy menu.
An Arctic Council of 8, not 5+3
The Ilulissat Declaration was, without question, a major policy achievement for the Arctic states;
however, the exclusion of Sweden, Iceland, and Finland was a major policy misstep. By excluding the
three non-littoral states from the Declaration, the scope of the agreement was not only reduced and
weakened, but positive relations with three major stakeholders in the Arctic suffered. As seen in
Southeast Asia, ASEAN grew from five states to ten, and this expansion committed more states “to
the regional code of conduct on territorial integrity and peaceful resolution of disputes” (Acharya
2009: 139). In the future, the Arctic Council should be a forum for multilateral gatherings as this will
serve to strengthen and legitimize the preeminent governing body in the region. As an outcome of
utilizing the AC as a forum, the Arctic Eight, not to mention permanent and ad hoc Observers, will all
be contributors in discussions and stakeholders in outcomes.
Elevate appointments to the Arctic Council
The degree of importance the Arctic Council holds, and nature of the issues that should be
approached, varies from actor-to-actor within the regime. Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship
(2013-2015) confirms this assertion as the Honorable Leona Aglukkaq, an Inuk from Nunavut, serves
as Chair reflecting Canada’s “commitment to ensur[ing] that the region’s future is in the hands of
Northerners” (Canada 2014). For the United States, it is impossible not to remove traditional security
and sovereignty concerns from Arctic Council initiatives, hence the appointment of Admiral Robert
Papp (Ret.), a longtime Coast Guard Commandant, as US Special Representative for the Arctic
(United States 2014). And the Arctic Council leadership picture only becomes more complicated when
Permanent Participant indigenous groups are thrown into the mix. While it is impossible to assign a
uniform rank for all AC representatives, all members should endeavor to appoint representatives to
the Council who have a wealth of regional knowledge. The success of ASEAN has made
representative status within member states a coveted position, and, one hopes, the same will be true
for all Arctic Council participants.
Building an Arctic defense community
One of the bright spots in Circumpolar North regional cooperation is surely scientific knowledge
sharing, but then again, nobody is talking about a scientific security dilemma. The Arctic states,
through the Arctic Council, should move to deepen defense cooperation in the region. Looking at
ASEAN, joint military exercises and the exchange of intelligence across state lines have served to
deepen cooperation while securing the region. Even though intelligence sharing within ASEAN is
often mere window-dressing, having a structure in place for unifying emergencies – such as the
disappearance of MH370 8