Arctic Yearbook 2015 - Page 300

300 Arctic Yearbook 2015 104). Given that these White Papers are often built at the domestic level without bi/multilateral considerations, the conclusions are traditionally out of lockstep with the priorities of other Arctic states and unions leaving any cleavages to be reconciled on an ad hoc basis, as was the case with the Ilulissat approach. Oran Young attributes the limits of cooperation in the Arctic to the fact that “no state has a clear-cut decision-making process for Arctic matters, much less a coherent policy” (Young 1992: 188). In spite of the deficiencies found in unilateral White Papers, there have been notable bilateral successes where policy priorities align. Project LORITA, a joint effort by Denmark and Canada in Lomonosov Ridge bathymetry, “will benefit from a joint plan for the investigation of the Lomonosov Ridge saving cost, sharing personnel resources and maximising the outcome of data” (LORITA 2006). So long as unilateral policy directives remain stunted due to policy incoherence, bilateral cooperation within specific issue areas will be the direct beneficiary. Functional multilateralism Within the international relations discipline, the theory of functionalism is often cited as a model for regional integration. Tracing its roots to Western European international integration, the functionalism model is well situated – both geographically and analytically – lending itself to any discussion of potential Arctic governance realignments. Broadly defined, functionalism is understood as “working together in common institutions helps to create political community at the popular level; within this community there is a working peace system: war is less likely because of functional cooperation” (Taylor 1996: 290).2 The “peace in parts” system exemplified by functionalism is recognized and has a proven track record (Nye 1971). Two unique phenomena occur as an outgrowth of functionalism. The first, spillover, occurs when cooperation is successful and “popular support presses for further integration and more common institutions” (Taylor 1996: 290). Spillback, the second, takes place when cooperative regimes fail to achieve their designed goal – these are typically economic failings – and countries believe more successful outcomes can be achieved on an individual basis. The father of functionalism, David Mitrany, suggests that the “essential principle is that activities would be selected specifically and organised separately – each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment” (Mitrany 1992: 502). Put into practical terms, functionalism – when the nature and needs of an activity are synthesized – results in a system that is not internally competitive being established. It should be evident that the functionalism regional integration model has not only played a major role in Arctic development to date, but also holds clues as to the nature of future cooperation. Examples of functionalism are readily available when considering Arctic governance; both the Nuuk and Kiruna Declarations illustrate areas of functional cooperation targeting a particular issue. Moreover, knowledge sharing between Arctic states through institutions such as IASC and AMAP highlight scientific integration within the region. The reason for Arctic functional cooperation is selfevident: the Arctic states are entering into functional agreements only where all parties see clear benefits. And therein lies the current dilemma. Cooperation in the Arctic in 2014 is slowing – not speeding up – and we are seeing functional cooperation cresting the natural carrying capacity. This Toward an Arctic Way