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which addressed in its programme the question of greater involvement of Observers in the work of
the Arctic Council. Moreover, whereas occurrence of the Arctic Five format that followed signing of
the Ilullisat Declaration in 2008 only by Arctic rim states raised a number of questions about the
legitimacy of various forums relevant for debating Arctic issues, the Arctic Council eventually came
out of those debates “revived and even strengthened” (Pedersen 2012: 205), when in the Ministerial
meeting in Nuuk in 2011 ministers announced the first legally binding agreement (on search and
rescue) negotiated under the auspices of the AC and decided to “respond to the challenges and
opportunities facing the Arctic by establishing a standing Arctic Council secretariat” (Arctic Council
2011).16
However, external events may have also potentially strong adverse effects on circumpolar cooperation.
At present, one much discussed issue is whether cooperation at the Arctic Council can continue after
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, an act strongly condemned by the other Arctic states.
Even though the situation is still unfolding, arguably the AC chair can play a role in those processes.
We may be seeing this happening presently, with the United States in its position as AC chair, taking
a much more conciliatory approach towards Russia on Arctic matters than it is able to take on nonArctic matters. Such appeasing, rather than belligerent, rhetoric adopted by the US AC officials helps
to insulate the Council from broader geopolitics as well as maintain the circumpolar platform as an
open channel of communication and collaboration at times of tensions and much worsening relations
in other parts of the world.
Conclusions
It seems fair to say that the office of the Arctic Council chair has grown in stature over time by default
rather than design. In course of negotiations over establishment of the Arctic Council, wrangles over
the design and the procedural issues, as noticed by David Scrivener, represented in fact debates on
more fundamental questions of purpose and direction (Scrivener 1999: 57). Since the United States
strongly opposed an idea of a new international organization with circumpolar focus, it consistently
held the minimalist view of the role the Council, objected to the creation of a permanent secretariat
and insisted on confining the actual role of the AC chair. Yet it appears that the AC rules of procedure
approved first in 1998 and revised in 2013 left enough scope for action for the Arctic states, as they
consecutively assumed the chair office, to use it to advance their national priorities and interests, even
though they were constrained to some degree by the consensual nature of decision-making in the
Council. In addition, the international environment and relative détente following the end of Cold
War, along with the upfront exclusion of controversial, military security matters from the Council
deliberations enabled the chairs to carry out functions extending beyond strictly assigned procedural
tasks and formalities. Perhaps the most noticeable example of the AC chair’s discretion has been