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Arctic Yearbook 2015
The Oryong 501 incident illustrates that, while the 2011 SAR Agreement may have been a step in the
direction of greater coordination and reduced uncertainty, there is still work to be done in combatting
institutional uncertainty in Arctic emergency response. At this point it should be noted that
institutional uncertainty is the area in which the most effort has been expended to manage the
wickedness of Arctic emergency response: the other criteria identified by the two frameworks
employed above (unstructured/cognitive uncertainty; cross-cutting/strategic uncertainty; and
relentless) are even less amenable to policy intervention.
The Oryong 501 case study, as well as the earlier application of two frameworks for analyzing wicked
problems, should make clear the wicked nature of Arctic emergency response. Rather than framing
the issue of emergency response in the Arctic as a purely technical problem for which a solution can
be engineered using risk assessment techniques, and applying regulatory tools, it is important to
recognize the unique aspects of wicked problems that are resistant to management efforts. What
lessons can be drawn from the literature that may help policymakers as they seek to address this
challenging issue?
Lessons from the literature on wicked problems
McBeth and Shanahan (2004) observe that wicked problems resist technical, scientific, and economic
solutions. Technical approaches often “reignite” or cause additional conflict (2004: 322). Scientific
evidence is “disputed, ignored, or manipulated” by stakeholders. While economic compensation often
fails to reduce conflict intensity, economic arguments for adaptation also fail to move opinion, and
market-based solutions are rarely employed (McBeth & Shanahan 2004: 323-4). Finally, they note that
values often lead to unnecessary conflict: “Because of values and emotions that stand outside rational
calculation of economic self-interest, policies get stuck in