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regional government (Thompson 2008). He also made significant investments in infrastructure in the
region. While ethnic stratification and state paternalism remained in regional decision-making bodies,
an ‘Indigenous Representatives Council’ was established to resolve indigenous issues and reserve seats
in the Regional Duma (parliament) for Chukotka’s indigenous peoples (Diatchkova 2010). Despite
these developments, however, there is still no clear indication that indigenous peoples have any
meaningful representation in regional or federal government institutions. Survey research conducted
through the international Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) project found that
indigenous respondents “[considered] the governorship of Roman Abramovich especially warmly”
(Abryutina 2007a). At the same time, at the end of Abramovich’s time in office, Diatchkova (2010:
226) noted:
The participants of the 2009 Congress of Chukotka’s indigenous peoples also
discussed the absence of any critical information on regional politics or indigenous
issues in the media. This is the main reason for the lack of knowledge in respect of
indigenous rights among current indigenous representatives.
Under current governor Roman Kopin, there have been some attempts to address the development
of indigenous peoples in the region. As noted above, often this involves struggles with the federal
government for resources to fund programs to support traditional livelihoods such as marine mammal
hunting. In a recent interview, the Head of the Department of Social Policy, Anastasia Zhukova
commented that “the government will continue to solve the problems of the indigenous population
of the district” (Masalova 2015). Although the government’s intentions are clearly worded, this topdown, paternalistic approach to development simply reinforces the power of the state over indigenous
peoples in the region, rather than allowing them to have greater control over their lives and their land.
Legislation on non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Although the Putin era has brought political and economic stability to Russia, it has also been
characterized by increasing political repression, especially of political opponents and organizations
that function outside the state. During the late Soviet and immediate post-Soviet period, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were an important means to develop Russian civil society, and
could rely on external financial support from foreign organizations (Daucé 2010). By the mid-2000s,
however, civil society had been largely coopted by the state through the creation of bodies such as the
Public Chamber and the increasing repression of NGOs. In 2006, the federal government passed
legislation On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, commonly
referred to as the “NGO Law” (Crotty & Hall 2013). Among other things, this law required groups
to register with the state and divulge personal information regarding their members and founders. It
allowed state officials unrestricted access to group meetings including private policy and campaigning
activities, and required reporting of foreign financial support, including how funds were being
obtained and spent, effectively restricting funding to domestic sources (Crotty & Hall 2013). In July
of 2012, additional legislation required NGOs with political activities and foreign funding to register
as ‘foreign agents’ and submit a report of their financial activities every quarter (Crotty, Hall &
Ljubownikow 2014). As a result, the state actively discriminates against internationally integrated
NGOs and western-funded human rights organizations (Frohlich 2012). In fact, recently enacted
Wilson & Kormos