103
Arctic Yearbook 2015
current hegemonic collective identity narrative has emerged, while the individual cases have been
emphasised by Naalakkersuisut’s (the Government of Greenland) annual foreign policy reports. The
three analyses will make visible how the designation of an external threat to the cultural traditions and
the envisioned future with more independence, have been used to legitimise a claim for extraordinary
rights with regard to whaling and more lenient CO2 reduction requirements. This double perspective
on a common heritage and an anticipated future reflects the tension between tradition and modernity
within the collective identity narrative, as tradition signals status quo while development means
change. This is also visible on the international level where the official communication oscillates
between portraying Greenlanders as either a minority or an equal partner depending on the situation;
something which may be an intentional strategy or a transitory phenomenon as a result of the relatively
recent transition from home rule to self-government.
The paper is theoretically inspired by Ole Wæver’s discursive approach to foreign policy analysis and
his understanding of foreign policy as based on a state’s self-image. Empirically, the author’s curiosity
has been stimulated by an interesting sentence on the webpage of Greenland’s Foreign Affairs
Department. Here it is written that Greenland’s foreign policy competence is regulated by three
measures: the Constitutional Act of Denmark, the Act on Greenland Self Government and practice
(Naalakkersuisut.gl n.d.). The fact that practice is also a regulatory factor indicates that the legal
frameworks may be open to interpretation, hence leaving a ‘window of opportunity’ for Greenland to
achieve a more autonomous foreign policy. But why then focus on how a collective identity narrative
has been articulated internationally? Besides the theoretical inspiration, statements such as the
following by the former Premier Aleqa Hammond have stimulated the curiosity. In her first opening
speech of Inatsisartut (Greenland’s parliament) she stated:
Greenland’s active participation internationally contributes to the drawing of attention
to Greenlandic interests and also to attract investments to the development in
Greenland. But it also signals that no one can step on us or override Greenland’s
interests. It provides the backbone; it gives pride. The individual citizen may also use
this to strengthen one’s self-awareness. As a people it can strengthen our culture, selfawareness and self-perception (Hammond 2013: 3. Author’s translation).
This statement shows a clear connection between the collective identity narrative and the development
of international relations. What is, however, conspicuous is the lacking definition of what characterises
the collective identity; what exactly is it that is possibly threatened or strengthened? To give an
adequate answer to this question, this paper refers to exemplary historical analyses of the emergence
of a collective Greenlandic identity and to articulations by the political parties in Inatsisartut. Together
with a short introduction to Wæver’s theoretical approach, these findings are necessary as basis for
the foreign policy analysis, and will, thus, be presented on the following pages.
Analytical strategy: foreign policy as representation and protection of a collective
identity
Ole Wæver’s discourse theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis observes a country’s foreign
affairs as being based on a specific identity representation, whose contingent composition is what
defines the state’s self-image (Wæver 2001: 285). This image is dependent on a dichotomy between
Jacobsen