Arctic Yearbook 2014 - Page 446

Arctic Yearbook 2014 446 dimension of security, participating States, on a voluntary basis, may therefore complement OSCE-wide confidence- and security-building measures through additional politically or legally binding measures, tailored to specific regional needs. On a voluntary basis, numerous measures provided for in the Vienna Document, in particular, could be adapted and applied in a regional context. Participating States may also negotiate additional regional CSBMs, in accordance with the principles [of the OSCE]” (VD'11 2011: 44). Since the mandate of the Arctic Council explicitly excludes issues of military defence (The Ottawa Declaration 1996: 2), any form of discussion or negotiation would probably best take place within the regularly meetings of the Arctic chiefs of defence staff (Lind 2014; Bergh 2014). Furthermore, most of the above mentioned and proposed steps could be implemented without any larger additional investments by the Arctic states, as they could simply make use of existing structures and regimes. This could for example be achieved by extending their mandates and by increasing their zones of application, which would furthermore increase the degree of capacity utilisation of the nation’s verification departments. In order to even further reduce costs, information exchanges and verifications in the Arctic region could be carried out in close cooperation such as through combined verification teams and institutions as it has already been proposed for future reforms of arms control in the European context (Schmidt 2013: 23 f.). In this regard, a potential CSBM regime in the Arctic could not only be designed in a more cost efficient manner, but the region could furthermore also serve as a role model for other areas or future reforms within the OSCE framework. The good co-operation among all Arctic states would in this aspect only further support such a forward-looking layout of arms control. The proposed systems of information exchange and verification could moreover also be used as complementing tools for SAR missions, maritime law enforcement, and border control as well as for the possible detection and observation of oil-spills and other environmental disasters. Such cooperation for example already exists in form of the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) (2014) or has been proposed for the extended use of the mandate of the treaty on Open Skies (Spitzer 2009: 10). Summary Summing up the practical proposals of this article, a possible future CSBM regime in the Arctic should include location-specific military information exchanges and measures of verification on military equipment, armed forces, and military exercises. Furthermore it should provide information on military policies and doctrines as well as preferably also incorporate additional measures of cooperation as well as commonly shared rules of engagement (Wezeman 2014). With regards to the zone of application, CSBMs should not be solely limited to the sovereign territories of the Arctic states, but also include the Arctic international waters. The more of these aspects are met by a potential future CSBM regime, the more it would be able to increase and manifest an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust. Confidence- & Security-Building Measures in the Arctic