Arctic Yearbook 2014 - Page 442

Arctic Yearbook 2014 442 different locations can be imagined: the peacetime location of armed forces or military equipment, their area of deployment and their participation in military exercises or manoeuvres. Second, the inspecting party must also have access to a respective measure of verification of which zone of application (ZoA) covers the geographic location reported within the information exchange. If both conditions are fulfilled, the implementation of CSBMs can lead to a strong reduction of private information within their ZoA and can thus be seen as “a medium and long-term proactive strategy intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment” (Carment & Schnabel 2003: 11). The positive effects of additional measures of ‘military co-operation’ and especially the aspect of person-to-person contacts have been repeatedly stressed during the conduction of several qualitative in-depth interviews (Lind 2014; Josefsson 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014). Such measures can be imagined to further contribute to a reduction of private information, through for example the invitation of observers to or even the conduction of joint major military exercises. In sum, the conflict preventing nature of CSBMs can be summarized in the following causal diagram: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Exchange of Military Information/Verification/ Military Co-Operation Independent Variable Reduced Level of Private Information Rationalist Explanation for War Causal Mechanism Conflict Prevention structural Dependent Variable Figure 5: Causal diagram of CSBMs as a Tool of Structural Conflict Prevention. From Theory to Practice: The Implementation of CSBMs as a Means to Manifest the Strong Arctic Co-operation Based on this article’s theoretical argumentation, it can be argued that the implementation of CSBMs in the Arctic Region would not only contribute to a manifestation, but even to a further strengthening of the already high levels of co-operation in the area, as a CSBM regime would: 1. Increase the overall levels of military transparency; 2. Establish a mutual understanding of all nation’s military intentions; 3. Serve as a strong signal of all Arctic states to their also in the future full commitment to existing laws and agreements; and 4. Provide assurances about the fully defensive nature of the nation’s increasing military presence in the region. Confidence- & Security-Building Measures in the Arctic