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among other thing), tourism, and a general easier access to Arctic settlements. The Russian
planting of a titanium flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007 and a general renewed interest in Arctic
matters in the international press also caught the attention of policymakers and analysts in
Copenhagen.
The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already aware that rising temperatures would have
an impact on Greenland and the political relations between the Arctic states (Home Rule of
Greenland & Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 4). In general, Copenhagen prefers to
preserve Arctic cooperation. A militarization of the Arctic would mean that small states, like
Denmark, risk being caught between the great powers. Denmark’s position is especially
precarious, because of the undetermined status of Greenland. Tensions between the Inuit
population of Greenland and Denmark proper would be more difficult to manage in an Arctic in
flux, where other great powers – most notably the United States – would try to solidify their
geopolitical interests in Greenland. Simply put, Copenhagen risks that Washington decides to cut
out the middle-man and supports Greenlandic independence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
moved quickly to help create better relations between the Arctic nations. The Ilulissat
Declaration, the result of a meeting held in Greenland between high-level representatives of the
five Arctic costal states in May 2008, helped establish these five states as the key players in the
region. The hope was that interstate cooperation could prevent an Arctic great game for
resources and territory.
Danish strategic thinking about the Arctic was grounded in policy documents and academic
studies. The first academic studies of the impact of climate change for defense planning were
soon conducted (Jørgensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2009; Petersen, 2009). These studies
focused on the strategic aspects of the changing Arctic and they plugged into the nascent
strategic debate about the future of the Arctic that had already been going on within the halls of
government. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-published an Arctic strategy draft
together with the Greenlandic Home Rule in 2008 (Home Rule of Greenland & Danish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The 2008 defense commission placed the Arctic among the fix points
for future defense planning (Defense Commission of 2008, 2009). Finally, in 2011, the Danish
government published an official Arctic strategy for the period running through 2020
(Government of Denmark, Government of Greenland, & Government of the Faroe Islands,
2011). These strategic publications marked a shift away from seeing the Arctic as a pristine area
that should be conserved – a nature reservation in the High North, so to speak – to a region ripe
with commercial opportunities (Home Rule of Greenland & Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2008: 7). Though conservation of the environment still played a role in Danish planning, the
focus was now on facilitating commercial opportunities. Denmark should focus on facilitating
and supporting regional cooperation, while ensuring that the Danish and Greenlandic authorities
were ready to handle changes in the commercial set-up in Greenland.
However, as is the case with most public strategies, the Danish Arctic strategy papers remain
mum when it comes to certain politically sensitive issues. There are two significant omissions.
First, the strategy papers do not discuss what Denmark gets out of its Arctic presence or how
Denmark could maximize Greenland’s value as a bargaining chip. Why does Denmark spend
significant resources on a remote Arctic island? How does Denmark get the most out of its
Greenland’s strategic position in Washington? How does Denmark intend to engage with other
Rahbek-Clemmensen