Vermont Bar Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 Summer 2014, Vol. 40, No. 2 | Page 6

President’s Column officers located the premises and identified a woman from a photograph contained in the phone. The police ultimately obtained a warrant to search that location.5 In Riley, officers seized the defendant’s phone, pursuant to an arrest for a gun charge, and reviewed photos and videos contained in the phone that demonstrated a gang affiliation and tied him to an earlier shooting.6 In April, the Supreme Court heard argument in these two cases. The argument was fascinating and demonstrated the difficulty in applying pre-digital legal concepts to digital facts.7 The Court wrestled with the question, “Is digital different?” Does the amount of information contained on modern phones change the equation? Does the nature of the information contained on modern phones change the equation? Do traditional methods of analyzing search and seizure issues help in reaching a conclusion? There is an analog analogy for almost any digital information. Photos can exist in print or digitally. A contact list can exist as a handwritten address book and could contain your home address. The information in a banking app can exist as a printed statement and carried on your person. GPS information from a phone can exist as a written set of directions or a written diary of locations visited. If the informa- tion is the kind of information that the police could have searched for in a pre-digital age, should they still be able to search for it on a phone? From the arguments, it appeared clear that had Riley’s home address been contained in an address book in his pocket or had Wurie’s photo been a photo contained in his wallet, the evidence would have been lawfully obtained and admissible. However, the Court ruled that digital is different and a search warrant was necessary before a search of a cell phone.8 Another example of how hard it can be to answer digital questions with pre-digital legal doctrine can be found in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones.9 In Jones, the Court had to examine the use of a GPS monitoring device that had been attached to the defendant’s vehicle without a search warrant. One question raised by the case was the surveillance of the defendant by the long term use of the GPS monitoring device. Another question raised by the case was the placing of the GPS monitoring device in the defendant’s vehicle. The Court unanimously ruled that a search warrant was needed, but the Court was split as to the reason why. The majority held that the “Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining in- formation. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”10 The concurrence accused the majority of applying “18th-century tort law” and would have analyzed “the question presented in this case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”11 This case highlights the difficulties that arise in using pre-digital doctrine to analyze digital issues. The movement of defendant’s vehicle was in plain view. The police could have watched the defendant’s vehicle’s public movements for the same twenty-eight day period without any implication of the Fourth Amendment. However, the entire Court agreed that a warrant was needed to affect the same outcome using digital means. This list is by no means exhaustive and these are only a few of the challenges that we will face as the law transitions into the digital age. We will all wrestle with these questions as they arise in each of our own areas of practice and our cases. Some of the old answers will still remain, but many will fall by the wayside. But, just as the VBA is moving to meet the challenges facing the legal profession as outlined by Chief Justice Reiber, the VBA will continue to meet the challenges brought on by these digital changes, whether it is through the presentation of continuing legal education courses that address issues raised by these changes or the work of the VBA sections. I know that this transition will not be easy, but the journey is certain to be interesting. ____________________ David Fenster, Esq., is Addison County State’s Attorney and the president of the Vermont Bar Associaton. ____________________ https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/scra/scraHome.do 2 Riley v. California, No. 13-132; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ____ (2014). 3 U.S. v. Wurie, No. 13-212; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ____ (2014). 4 U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Under the Vermont Constitution, such searches are similarly permitted, with the exception of closed containers absent exigent circumstances. State v. Neil, 2008 VT 79. 5 U.S. v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (CA1 2013) 6 People v. Riley, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist., Feb. 8, 2013) (unpublished). 7 h t t p : / / w w w. s u p r e m e c o u r t . g o v / o r a l _ arguments/argument_audio_detail. aspx?argument=13-132&TY=2013; http://www. supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ audio_detail.aspx?argument=13-212&TY=2013. 8 Riley, 573 U.S. ____, slip op. at 10 (2014). 9 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 10 Id. at 949. 11 Id. at 945. 1 6 THE VERMONT BAR JOURNAL • WINTER 2014 www.vtbar.org