Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 86

BOOK REVIEWS

century multinational operations. Numerous nations
converged on China in the late 19th century as the
sole remaining frontier for colonial growth, dividing
primarily coastal areas—captured land—for trading
posts and naval resupply stations. At the same time,
the long-standing governance structures based around
a Chinese emperor were quickly disintegrating.
The environment of weakening local power and
increasing incursion of Western cultural, religious,
and military might created a backlash among disillusioned Chinese. As in the past, conservative locals
rallied around groups that adhered to the religious and
cultural principles they felt were slipping away; in
1900, this took the form of the Boxers. On the other
side, descriptions of how colonial nations attempted,
and ultimately failed, to join forces to put down the
rebellion were of particular interest.
David L. Silbey comprehensively covers the events
of the Boxer Rebellion, from the dynamics creating the
conflagration to the Western response and the ultimate
results. He obviously knows the subject well and uses
a plethora of primary and contemporary sources, as
well as other analyses of the events of 1900. However,
as is the case with many histories written by Western
authors, the sources are predominantly those of the
English-speaking nations, missing the other side of
the narrative.
Overall, The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game
in China is a great linear description of the events of
1900. However, it leaves much to be desired as a compelling story that could educate the uninitiated. I do not
recommend the book for those seeking an engaging
story of the Boxer Rebellion, but I do recommend it for
those who are attempting to develop a comprehensive
understanding of why and how this event occurred.
Capt. Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army,
Cambridge, Massachusetts

THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY IN LIMITED WAR:

Case Studies in Success and Failure, 1945-1999
Kevin Dougherty, McFarland & Co.,
Jefferson, NC, 2012, 227 pages, $40.00

T

HROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, and especially
since 1945, the U.S. military has engaged in

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far more low-intensity conflicts than conventional
wars. Recognizing this, the 1993 edition of U.S.
Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, recognized
a separate category known as operations other than
war. Although this term has fallen out of favor, retired
colonel Kevin Dougherty argues for the continued
validity of the principles it represents: perseverance,
objectivity, security, unity of effort (for coalition
operations), legitimacy, and restraint.
To explore this topic, the author considers eight
dissimilar military actions of the post-war era. Four
generally were successful—U.S. assistance during
the Greek Civil War, the 1958 intervention in Lebanon, the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention, and
the 1980s confrontation with Marxist Nicaragua. Four
operations failed: the pacification aspects of Vietnam,
and ill-defined interventions in Beirut (1982-1983),
Somalia, and Haiti. Dougherty’s conclusions sometimes seem self-evident, but they are useful. The keys
to success, he argues, are perseverance, objective, and
sufficient security to protect the troops while helping
convince the population the operation is legitimate.
As in any military operation, failure to specify and
focus on an achievable objective often led to disaster.
In the second Beirut operation, for example, he says
there was no clear mission because no political agreement existed on the ground. However, U.S. forces had
to operate under restrictive rules of engagement as if
they were engaged in peacekeeping.
There are a few flaws with the study. The author
accepts the traditional interpretation that the Greek
Civil War was a deliberate communist attempt to seize
power, whereas revisionists have argued persuasively
that the right wing leaders of the royal government
and army were so determined to repress all leftists
that they forced the leftists to revolt in self-defense.
Many of the events in the book are now so unfamiliar that readers would benefit from maps for general
orientation.
Such minor questions do not detract from the real
value of the study. In an era when internal defense,
stability, and contingency deployments remain
common missions for U.S. troops, this selection of
case studies correctly emphasizes the enduring issues
that should guide military planning and analysis. As
such, Dougherty’s book is worthwhile reading for
professional soldiers and the general public.
Col. Jonathan M. House, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
May-June 2014

MILITARY REVIEW