Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 8

example, by the 16th century, armies had combined
muskets with pikes and armored knights. During
the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, some speculated
that Russian forces integrated OCO with traditional
operations to enhance their overall operational
effectiveness. The Russians evidently conducted
numerous cyberspace attacks that rendered Georgia’s governmental and media networks inoperable.6 These attacks severely disrupted Georgian
military C2. They were synchronized with the Russian troops’ crossing of the Georgian border.7 Cyber
expert Eli Jellenc stated this event represented
“the birth of true, operational cyber warfare,” as it
appeared to be the first coordinated usage of cyber
and conventional attacks on a nation state.8
A complementary weapon eventually can evolve
into a primary weapon. For example, the musket
equipped with a socket bayonet replaced the pike
by the early 18th century as the universal infantry
arm. In 2010, a computer worm known as Stuxnet
evidently was used as a primary offensive weapon
to create tangible operational effects. Stuxnet, while
of unknown origin, was a “fire and forget” program,
considered the world’s first “cyber missile.”9 The
program apparently was deployed to sabotage Iran’s
nuclear fuel-refining centrifuges, which could be
used to develop weapons-grade uranium, by altering the electrical current.10 According to German

researcher Ralph Langner, the attack may have
been intended to destroy the centrifuge rotor by
vibration—which could cause the centrifuge to
explode—or simply to degrade the output over
time (by slowing down and speeding up the
motor).11 Stuxnet—although delivered through
what is perceived as a nonphysical and nonlethal
domain—achieved decidedly physical effects by
damaging Iranian nuclear facilities.
The examples from Iran and Georgia show how
OCO have produced effects ranging from nonphysical harassment and information operations
through physical damage to key infrastructure.
Without forces or weapons having direct physical
contact, OCO can create nonphysical and physical operational effects. They can shut down air
defense systems and C2 nodes, open or close a
dam’s floodgates, and destroy or damage industrial
machines such as nuclear centrifuges.12 Offensive
cyberspace capabilities, like standard lethal and
tangible weapons, can be arrows in a JTF commander’s quiver. They can enable a commander to
address a range of targets efficiently, on their own
or in conjunction with other weapons.
The ”I don’t understand it” or “I can’t get
to it” misconception. Cyberspace capabilities,
particularly OCO, tend to be shrouded in secrecy.
OCO are highly classified because the nature of
these operations could
divulge strategic and operational intentions if they
are revealed. If a hostile
power learned about even
one OCO target under
development, that power
could learn much about
U.S. cyberspace capabilities and a combatant command’s operations. If certain enemies learned that
an operation plan featuring
them as a target involved
a cyberspace attack on an
infrastructure node, they
could use U.S. military
doctrine to develop some
understanding of the plan.
Further, if technical data
An Iranian technician works at the Uranium Conversion Facility just outside the city of Isfahan 255 miles south of
were compromised, an
Tehran, Iran, 3 February 2007. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)
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May-June 2014

MILITARY REVIEW