Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 66

Peace

Persistent
Conflict

State vs.
State War

Persistent Conflict Between Peace and War

political borders or even by international law.
Adversaries of this nature continually adapt to
changing political and social environments, and
these irregular conflicts become “contests for
influence and legitimacy.”5 The defining characteristics of the conflicts come from the relationships between individuals, families, and ethnic
or religious groups. The conflicts simmer over
generations because of family, ethnic, or religious
ties between the fighters. Persistent conflict itself
becomes a network in which trust and intimate
contact between individuals predominate.
According to David Tucker, a professor at the
Naval Postgraduate School, the overwhelming
evidence from psychology and sociology shows
that the decision to pursue violence is made in the
context of an established social network that aids
the mobilization and recruitment of members.6
Ties from family, kin and tribe, ethnic group,
religious organization, workplace, education, and
area of residence influence choices and objectives.
Conflicts drag on because the underlying causes
of the violence extend across generations, regions,
and countries. The nature of adversarial networks
and the characteristics of persistent conflicts—
including how long they continue—require a light
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touch from the United States. When the United
States gets involved in these conflicts, overwhelming offensive power will not be the solution.

Success in Irregular Conflicts

The United States has successfully supported
partners against nonstate adversaries in El Salvador, Colombia, and the Philippines—and not
entirely through military means. In the early
1980s, the Reagan administration found itself
fighting a violent insurgency in El Salvador. In
the same decade, the war on drugs was focused
on the country of Colombia, where a significant
portion of the world’s cocaine is still produced.7
In 2002, as part of the Global War on Terror, the
Bush administration created a small task force in
the Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf guerrillas.8 These efforts could be called “economy of
force” actions, while the bulk of the U.S. defense
establishment was engaged elsewhere. The Cold
War military establishment was still protecting
Europe; El Salvador was seen as a secondary
theater. Sustained support to Colombia and the
Philippines continued even while the focus of
DOD became Afghanistan and then Iraq.
May-June 2014

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