Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 51

NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE was disseminated to the battalion operating in the area.47 The enemy was attacked using Army aviation. Because the command group already understood enemy casualty evacuation TTPs, the battle staff was ordered to perform an immediate analysis of how and where the enemy would evacuate their casualties. The understanding that developed during earlier operations was used to turn the ongoing datainformation-knowledge transformations of this engagement into wisdom. Through coup d’œil, the command group understood the enemy would seek out high-quality medical facilities and evacuate casualties quickly over good routes. Enemy casualties were subsequently identified because IS use was guided by this refined coup d’œil. Analysis of vignette 2. Several months before deploying to Afghanistan, the geospatial engineer section of the battle staff collected data about the terrain and infrastructure of the anticipated area of operations. The data were refined and updated during the first 50 days of combat. After the aerial attack on the enemy, a geographic IS was used to evaluate the data and perform an assessment of where the enemy might evacuate their casualties. Four options were selected; however, they were all outside the TF Stryker area of operations. After approval by the TF Stryker commander, the staff communicated the options via email to TF Stryker liaisons with other coalition units. By midnight, Afghan police, dispatched based on the predictive analysis, identified six wounded enemy fighters at the first predicted location and agreed to take responsibility for them.48 Summary of vignettes. Forces seldom find enemy personnel after evacuation from the battlefield because they seldom get feedback about the enemy evacuation channel in time to act. Typically, reports about enemy casualties come through intelligence reporting days, weeks, or months after the event—if ever. A network-centric warfare framework integrated with the DIKW hierarchy and coup d’œil improved decision making during combat based on the BCT’s IS output. The integration enabled TF Stryker data and information transformations across the operational area, leading to knowledge that resulted in enemy detention (vignette 1). The framework also enabled accurate prediction because of transformations from knowledge to wisdom, guided by a honed coup d’œil, that the force acted upon in minutes (vignette 2). These experiences demonstrate that the predictive planning and preemption, integrated force management, and execution of time-critical missions envisioned by network-centric warfare theorists are possible.49 Conclusion The framework provided for network-centric warfare theory integrates people, the IS, and traditional military theory. Army forces already have applied such a framework innovatively during real-world infantry combat operations in Afghanistan. Technically competent, courageous, and well-trained soldiers remain important for the successful implementation of network-centric warfare theory. Technology cannot replace the essential and historically significant aspects of traditional military leadership. The integration of network-centric warfare theory with the DIKW hierarchy, coup d’œil, and determination provides soldiers with unparalleled opportunities for knowledge discovery and action in an information-rich environment. This enhances human decision making in the intense, uncertain environment of close combat. MR NOTES 1. James Manyika, Michael Chui, Brad Brown, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Charles Roxburgh, and Angela Hung Byers, “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity” (McKinsey Global Institute, May 2011), 3-4, . 2. Ibid., 3. 3. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings 124, no. 1139 (1998), ; Department of Defense (DOD), Report on Network Centric Warfare Sense of the Report, Arthur L. Money (March 2001), 8, . 4. Raymond J. Curts and Joseph P. Frizzell, “Implementing Network-Centric MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2014 Command and Control,” report for the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The Future of C2 (17 March 2005): 4, 1618, 20-21; John Nagl, “Learning and Adapting to Win,” Joint Force Quarterly 3rd Quarter, no. 58 (2010): 123-24. 5. CIO [U.S. Chief Information Officer] Council, “A year in Review: Outcomes and Lessons Learned from Implementing Agency-Led TechStat Reviews Across th e Federal Government” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 8 December 2011), 10; Report of U.S. Chief Information Officer on federal information technology budgets, Steven VanRoekel, “Federal Information Technology FY 2013 Budget Priorities: ‘Doing More With Less’” (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 4-6. 6. DOD, Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of NetworkCentric Warfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): 8; Ang Yang, “Understanding Network Centric Warfare,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research [BASOR] 23(4)(2004): 2-3. 49