Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 51
NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
was disseminated to the battalion operating in
the area.47 The enemy was attacked using Army
aviation. Because the command group already
understood enemy casualty evacuation TTPs, the
battle staff was ordered to perform an immediate analysis of how and where the enemy would
evacuate their casualties.
The understanding that developed during earlier
operations was used to turn the ongoing datainformation-knowledge transformations of this
engagement into wisdom. Through coup d’œil,
the command group understood the enemy would
seek out high-quality medical facilities and evacuate casualties quickly over good routes. Enemy
casualties were subsequently identified because
IS use was guided by this refined coup d’œil.
Analysis of vignette 2. Several months before
deploying to Afghanistan, the geospatial engineer section of the battle staff collected data about the terrain
and infrastructure of the anticipated area of operations. The data were refined and updated during the
first 50 days of combat. After the aerial attack on the
enemy, a geographic IS was used to evaluate the data
and perform an assessment of where the enemy might
evacuate their casualties. Four options were selected;
however, they were all outside the TF Stryker area
of operations. After approval by the TF Stryker commander, the staff communicated the options via email
to TF Stryker liaisons with other coalition units. By
midnight, Afghan police, dispatched based on the
predictive analysis, identified six wounded enemy
fighters at the first predicted location and agreed to
take responsibility for them.48
Summary of vignettes. Forces seldom find
enemy personnel after evacuation from the battlefield because they seldom get feedback about the
enemy evacuation channel in time to act. Typically,
reports about enemy casualties come through intelligence reporting days, weeks, or months after
the event—if ever. A network-centric warfare
framework integrated with the DIKW hierarchy
and coup d’œil improved decision making during
combat based on the BCT’s IS output. The integration enabled TF Stryker data and information
transformations across the operational area, leading to knowledge that resulted in enemy detention
(vignette 1). The framework also enabled accurate
prediction because of transformations from knowledge to wisdom, guided by a honed coup d’œil, that
the force acted upon in minutes (vignette 2). These
experiences demonstrate that the predictive planning and preemption, integrated force management,
and execution of time-critical missions envisioned
by network-centric warfare theorists are possible.49
Conclusion
The framework provided for network-centric
warfare theory integrates people, the IS, and
traditional military theory. Army forces already
have applied such a framework innovatively
during real-world infantry combat operations in
Afghanistan. Technically competent, courageous,
and well-trained soldiers remain important for
the successful implementation of network-centric
warfare theory. Technology cannot replace the
essential and historically significant aspects
of traditional military leadership. The integration of network-centric warfare theory with the
DIKW hierarchy, coup d’œil, and determination
provides soldiers with unparalleled opportunities for knowledge discovery and action in an
information-rich environment. This enhances
human decision making in the intense, uncertain
environment of close combat. MR
NOTES
1. James Manyika, Michael Chui, Brad Brown, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs,
Charles Roxburgh, and Angela Hung Byers, “Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity” (McKinsey Global Institute, May 2011), 3-4,
.
2. Ibid., 3.
3. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin
and Future,” Proceedings 124, no. 1139 (1998), ; Department
of Defense (DOD), Report on Network Centric Warfare Sense of the Report, Arthur L. Money (March 2001), 8, .
4. Raymond J. Curts and Joseph P. Frizzell, “Implementing Network-Centric
MILITARY REVIEW
May-June 2014
Command and Control,” report for the 10th International Command and Control
Research and Technology Symposium: The Future of C2 (17 March 2005): 4, 1618, 20-21; John Nagl, “Learning and Adapting to Win,” Joint Force Quarterly 3rd
Quarter, no. 58 (2010): 123-24.
5. CIO [U.S. Chief Information Officer] Council, “A year in Review: Outcomes
and Lessons Learned from Implementing Agency-Led TechStat Reviews Across th e
Federal Government” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 8
December 2011), 10; Report of U.S. Chief Information Officer on federal information
technology budgets, Steven VanRoekel, “Federal Information Technology FY 2013
Budget Priorities: ‘Doing More With Less’” (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 4-6.
6. DOD, Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of NetworkCentric Warfare (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): 8; Ang Yang, “Understanding
Network Centric Warfare,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research
[BASOR] 23(4)(2004): 2-3.
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