Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 49

NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE

The 29th Combat Aviation Brigade deployed its Army Battlefield Command System to Bethany Beach, Del., for annual training, 13-27 May
2010. ABCS is a digital system of networked components that gives commanders a better perspective of their operating environment, assets,
resources, and strengths. (U.S.National Guard, Sgt. Thaddeus Harrington)

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2), a ruggedized, PC-size computer that
displays the common operational picture, provides
position location information, is capable of text
communication, and operates on the lower tactical Internet (small unit, terrestrial line-of-sight)
and upper tactical Internet (battalion and higher,
satellite).34
Not all components of ABCS technology are
recent developments. For example, FBCB2 predates 9/11. Furthermore, not all elements of ABCS
were designed to work together. The battle management systems used by different staff sections,
for instance, were developed independently. 35
They were integrated into one IS to support command and control over a period of years. Because
of this integration, commanders have had many
opportunities to employ formations according to
network-centric warfare theory. Unfortunately,
one of the shortfalls of ABCS implementation is
that institutional and unit training are inadequate.
Units frequently rely on contractors for training, limiting the manner in which these digital
systems are incorporated into training.36 These
practices are indicative of Army-wide technology
resistance.37
MILITARY REVIEW

May-June 2014

The difference in capability between legacy command and control tools and a modern tactical IS
such as ABCS is enormous. When network-centric
warfare theory first was envisioned, the needed
command and control systems for Army formations had not been created. Today, the evolution and
integration of network-centric capabilities makes it
possible to implement network-centric operations.
Unfortunately, the intellectual effort necessary to
use information-age military tools effectively did
not keep up. After 9/11, less offensively oriented
military approaches gained ascendency, and a lack
of decisive operations was claimed to characterize
modern war. The indecisive nature of operations
resulted from a falsely assumed lack of information
superiority that became a common theme of COIN.38
Because the Army never adopted network-centric
warfare theory for conducting operations, it does
not have an adequate doctrinal framework to use
the superb IT capabilities that reside within every
tactical formation.
Network-centric warfare theory is sometimes
derided because it is seen as placing too much
emphasis on technology, or it is considered unsuitable for COIN and counterterrorism operations.39
This thinking misses the mark. Network-centric
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