Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 48

has a well-formed, mature coup d’œil to apply to
knowledge during operations.
There is an important note of caution. Coup d’œil
and determination work together. It is relatively easy
using a modern IS to develop situational awareness, but it is much harder to act, particularly when
potential consequences of poor decisions include
censure from others or injury and death within the
command or to the commander. Clausewitz recognized that competence and the ability to be resolute
decrease in some leaders based on the duration and
frequency of the leader’s exposure to danger.25 This
perspective illustrates the need for caution when
advocating for “flattening” decision making.26 Flattening (reducing middle layers of a hierarchy and
giving more autonomy to skilled individuals) is not
always wise or possible in a networked environment
because the authority to decide or act at certain
echelons might be restricted (by law, policy, or
other constraints). Furthermore, subordinates may
wish to defer decisions to a higher headquarters for
a variety of reasons. Finally, ease of analysis is not
equivalent to experience when it comes to decision
making. Just because technology enhances analysis
does not mean it improves coup d’œil—a second
lieutenant is still an inexperienced leader regardless
of the technology used.
The consequence of poorly developed coup
d’œil, as applied to the DIKW hierarchy, can be
catastrophic if a commander’s poor decision (or
indecision) affords the enemy an advantage. Even
leaders using the DIKW hierarchy could make errors
and poor decisions: as Jay H. Bernstein writes, “folly
proceeds from error and exacerbates it.”27 Folly
and error can come from overreliance on technology. Networks permit flattening an organization; in
business, many consider flattening an organization
desirable. However, overreliance on technology
can increase opportunities for folly to manifest by
increasing the number of people making decisions,
especially in military organizations. Commanders
should avoid technology-centric organizational
designs based on the capability and performance of
hardware and software. They should avoid decentralizing decision making simply because the technology
makes it possible. Network-centric operations are
human-centered. Network-centered warfare theory
provides a framework for military leaders to take
full advantage of technology. In this human-centered
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theory, the success or failure of operations is based
on the quality of a commander’s action rather than
the capabilities of technology.
Intuition, a type of domain knowledge that serves
as a personal repository of historical information for
decision making, is developed through experience
and practice.28 Coup d’œil is a military-specific form
of intuition initially formed through training, but it
requires close combat experience to reach full maturity. Moreover, intuition has an important place in the
design of technological systems. In intelligent systems research, the notion of “sensemaking” includes
a goal of designing systems that allows people to
access the intuition of other people.29 Sensemaking
is an element of the social domain within networkcentric warfare theory.30

Computing and Command and
Control

A small number of soldiers in ground combat
maneuver units have used PCs on a day-to-day basis
since the 1980s. Early PCs typically were found
in the operations section and were used for office
productivity tasks such as writing orders, preparing
presentations, or planning troop movements. They
were not networked or employed collaboratively.
Tactical command and control were exercised
according to an established hierarchy with little
lateral situational awareness; they were exercised
largely through analog voice communication or
personal presence.31 If information was exchanged
with another unit, it was often done via analog voice
communication or the physical exchange of map
overlays and other materials. In addition, specialized items of digital technology, such as artillery
computers, were in use before 1990.
As PCs became increasingly common in the
military workplace, concepts for digitizing U.S.
Army formations were also evolving. By the 1990
Gulf War, Army tactical units communicated
using packet-switched mobile networks that
provided secure voice, facsimile, and computer
communication services.32 Today, the Army uses
the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) to
support command and control. ABCS is a digital
system intended to integrate other battle management systems into a comprehensive tactical digital
architecture.33 The system normally is associated
with battalion and brigade level; however, components are used at other levels. An example is
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