Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 89

BOOK REVIEWS proliferate on COIN. And yet, the causes and nature of insurgency per se are seldom mentioned.” Delving into this problem, the book’s first three chapters examine the importance of grievances— whether social, economic, or political—that engender insurgencies. However, solving such grievances is beyond the realm of the military’s capability. The author details how the military decision making process is ill suited to resolve insurgent grievances because it remains locked in a philosophical framework advocated by Antoine Jomini. The problem of differing means and ends in combating insurgencies shapes Lamborn’s argument throughout the book. For example, he argues, “the U.S. Army has yet to figure out that Jomini has no place in the graduate school of warfare.” In no way is Arms of Little Value a sardonic critique of the U.S. military. The author makes an effort to point out historical cases in which the United States made wise decisions regarding its foreign policy and use of its military. A consistent theme in this regard is that success in countering insurgencies has occurred where the United States supported host governments that reformed the negative practices that served as rationale for revolution. Insurgencies have an emboldened cause where reform has not occurred, as in the case of South Vietnam where Ngo Dinh Diem exemplified failure as a leader. Conversely, Magsaysay in the Philippines eventually overcame the Hukbalahap insurgency because of his willingness to reform. In all cases, political legitimacy is key and cannot be accomplished solely through military power or inundating a country with development aid unless real and perceived reform occurs. This issue is still problematic for the United States. Despite the astronomical investment by the American people in national security, the defense establishment has shown itself less than fully competent at dealing with low-intensity conflict—insurgency. The answer to this failure is straightforward: the political roots of warfare have been forgotten. This contentious claim applies to the institutional organization and pathos of the military. Notably, Lamborn cites the expertise of several contemporary generals such as Stanley McChrystal as exceptions. A troubling argument, one central to the book, is the inability of the U.S. military to truly adapt into an organization that teaches and understands the political foundations of insurgency, despite its publicized MILITARY REVIEW March-April 2014 statements that it is an evolving and “adaptable” force. Lamborn recognizes that the U.S. military has been handed politically oriented tasks for which it is not organized, and he drives home the point that other departments must shoulder a greater share. Emphasizing conventional exercises and training officers how to plan static defenses, for example, are understandable but obviously ill-suited to address an insurgency. The author argues that this is a myopic approach and that our military has yet to get its institutional arms around political warfare embodied through insurgency. This is important to fix, Lamborn argues, since political warfare in the form of insurgencies will constitute the type of warfare most likely to occur in the