Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 30
approach toward securing MANPADS in Syria.
Further, the problem set reinforces the importance
of a close State-DOD partnership; however, it also
reveals many of the shortcomings that still exist
regarding interagency cooperation. Finally, the
case of Syria provides a clear example for why
State is so well equipped to engage in effective
interagency coordination and how aspects of their
culture could, and should, be adopted by others
to improve cooperation.
The good news is that a great deal of institutional effort was expended to prepare for the
potential threat posed by MANPADS in Syria.
This issue captures the attention of our nation’s
leadership due to the deleterious effects it could
have on global commerce. Clearly, the only way
to tackle the issue is through an interagency
response, and, arguably, the most important factor
for any such response is the State-DOD relationship. Therefore, I offer some ways to improve
State-DOD coordination to secure MANPADS in
Syria, as well as for the numerous other transnational threats the United States faces.
The first proposal is for situations like the one
we face in Syria—that is, contingency planning to
mitigate the impact of a particular threat. A way to
promote collaboration would be to insert personnel from each organization into the planning body
of the other early in the process. For example, in
the case of Syria, contingency planning, Foreign
Service officers (or civil servants) from Near Eastern Affairs Bureau or the Bureau of Conflict and
Stability Operations could be assigned as members
of the issue-focused USCENTCOM planning cell
as soon as it was stood up. Similarly, assigning
military officers from the USCENTCOM J-5 (or
Joint Staff) to either of the aforementioned State
Department bureaus would provide a DOD voice
in State Department efforts. The benefit of this
solution is that it integrates efforts early and is a
relatively easy, flexible response for both organizations. Clearly, individuals in selected positions
would have to be identified and prepared to serve
when and where they are most needed.
Another way, beyond early engagement in the
various planning processes, is to expand interagency assignment opportunities and reward select
personnel with promotion incentives or some other
lucrative benefit. Essentially, this is an argument
for expanding the existing CGSC fellowship and
other DOD-State personnel exchange program
assignments that exist today. I am sure divisionlevel staffs would welcome the addition of State
Department political advisors, while State would
be more than happy to integrate more military
officers within their bureaus and offices.8
Further, select officers (Foreign Service and
military) should be assigned to counterpart agencies early in their careers to enable subsequent
assignments. This would enable those officers
to build experiences and contribute to a deeper
interagency relationship down the road. A successful expansion of the existing program can
only be achieved by providing incentives for participants, such as promotion incentives or some
other reward. The benefit will be top-tier talent
seeking out interagency positions. Much work
remains, but implementation of some of these
recommendations would go a long way to improve
the situation. MR
NOT