Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 28

For example, when it came to planning for securing MANPADS in Syria, State’s informal nature
initially presented some coordination challenges,
especially with DOD. It took State a while to figure
out how to approach the problem, including how
to integrate interagency partners into its informal
planning process. Conversely, DOD had multiple
plans ready to go on the shelf to contend with the
situation in Syria—plans derived through rigorous
staff processes such as the military decision-making
process and joint operation planning process.
The Department of Defense’s formalized system
lends a sense of regimen to its planning, something
that is sorely missing at State. However, after
myriad detailed discussions between State and our
counterparts at DOD, we were able to complement one another’s internal planning processes by
informing and integrating efforts.

The Critical Piece: State-DOD
Coordination
State worked closely with DOD planners and
other federal agencies to coordinate the response to
the threat posed by MANPADS in Syria. Ten-plus
years of warfare have taught us that the military
element of power alone is not sufficient to achieve
national security objectives. In particular, the U.S.
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan reveals how
important it is to orchestrate all the elements of
national power so they work in concert and have
mutually supporting effects.
With that in mind, contingency planning for
securing MANPADS in the Levant is predicated
on a whole-of-government approach. While the
U.S. aim is for a diplomatic solution to end the
crisis in Syria, the importance of the region to U.S.
interests has forced DOD leaders (and planners) to
work in earnest with counterparts throughout the
government to update existing plans and provide
the president with military options to contend
with the situation in the region. To that end, State
Department planners have worked closely with their
DOD and interagency counterparts to coordinate
various efforts to secure MANPADS and ensure
current DOD plans are reflective of broader U.S.
government interests. In fact, the plan to secure
MANPADS in Syria has been coordinated throughout the U.S. government to such a degree that it is
truly an interagency effort.
26

Planning for the crisis in Syria—a crisis that is
likely to span the spectrum of conflict—is evidence
the U.S. military must engage the State Department
early and often and be as transparent as possible to
achieve organizational goals. Early candid discussions are critical because they reveal those activities
best suited for the military and those best left to the
diplomatic and technical experts from State. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, a consistent
dialogue early between State and the military can
mitigate duplication of effort and clearly delineate
roles and responsibilities each should play in particular contingencies.
When planning for MANPADS in Syria, planners
with the Interagency MANPADS Task Force worked
closely with their counterparts in DOD to integrate
plans for securing MANPADS into existing DOD
efforts. In addition, planners from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, United
States Central Command (USCENTCOM), United
States European Command, and relevant defense support agencies kept both the Interagency MANPADS
Task Force and the broader State Department apprised
of their priorities and plans in general for the crisis
in Syria. This coordination enabled each individual
organization to understand one another’s priorities
and concerns and identify the roles and responsibilities each was best suited to undertake in Syria.
The other important factor regarding State and
DOD coordination is transparency. A high level of
information sharing engenders trust and helps establish a common operational picture among organizations. This is important because parochialism often
prevents agencies from fully disclosing the extent
and nature of their planning efforts. Transparency
between State and DOD was an issue when it came
to Syria contingency planning. While planners shared
information on issues like assistance, refugee flows,
and the like, both sides were reticent to engage in
extended dialogue on more detailed planning efforts.
Unfortunately, stovepipes and other “cylinders of
excellence” remain alive and well within the U.S.
interagency planning process; consequently, any U.S.
plan is likely to be duplicative and inefficient at best
and incomplete and fratricidal at worst. Overall, failure to share information between organizations that
are supposed to be part of the same team could lead
to distrust and ultimately undermine U.S. government
objectives vis-à-vis Syria.
March-April 2014

MILITARY REVIEW