Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 96
Knutson only briefly examines the critical role of
the intelligence process, which drives everything from
identifying future capabilities of potential adversaries, to the targeting of adversarial structures, to the
post-strike assessment. Knutsen’s deferment to the
private end of the bureaucratic battleground in the
work’s conclusion, which underlies any weapons acquisition project, reveals a “pro-business” leaning. The
migratory nature of managerial military personnel,
piecemeal congressional budgeting, and excessive oversight “creep,” such as the Nunn–McCurdy Provision,
certainly slow acquisition. However, those examples of
development projects troubled by private fraud, waste,
and abuse are conveniently absent from Knutsen’s
concluding remarks.
Knutsen’s work provides a compelling, albeit generalized, overview of the development and implementation of U.S. strike warfare. By using commonplace
terminology and day-to-day comparisons, the author
achieves his objective of bridging the gap between
the fictional and technical. Strike Warfare in the 21st
Century is an excellent introduction for the average citizen but also for military personnel unfamiliar with the
topic. The increasingly joint nature of warfare necessitates that any commander possess an understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of strike weapons,
which provide life-or-death support within the contemporary operating environment. Knutsen skillfully
contributes to this understanding within his appealing
work on modern strike warfare.
Viktor M. Stoll, Lee’s Summit, Missouri
LOGICS OF WAR:
Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts
Alex Weisiger, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY,
2013, 288 pages, $45.00
L
ogics of War uses bargaining models to explain the intensity and duration of interstate
conflicts. Its models are most useful at strategic or political-military policy levels. Logics of War
contains no insight on how to conduct war, but is a
must read for those concerned about war’s motivation,
potential cost, duration, or intractability. Alex Weisiger
makes two major contributions. First, he argues that
94
there are multiple paths to war–equifinality in academic jargon. This insight seems fitting given the complex
nature of war and liberating by allowing his development of independent causal mechanisms. Second, his
explanations are comprehensive, accounting for both
short and long wars and variations in intensity.
Logics of War is a political science book, which is
at best moderately successful in explaining its statistical methods for the unfamiliar or out of practice.
Statistical evidence is buttressed with case studies that
any reader can understand. Because the book is not
limited across time (after 1816) or space, Weisiger’s
theories are not restricted to any particular war. As
with any such literature, much depends on the validity and reliability of proxy variables. For example,
concepts of power, commitment, trust, or leaders’
interpretation of information are either unavailable
or unobservable. However, Weisiger designs and
justifies his measures as well as or better than similar
scientific literature. Weisiger’s choice of cases such
as the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870, World War
II in Europe and the Pacific, the Iran-Iraq War, the
Falklands War, and the Persian Gulf War builds confidence in the statistical results.
Logics of War characterizes leaders as information-bounded rational actors. Perhaps to appeal to a
broader audience, the book avoids the term rational
and fails to adequately explain the meaning of rationality paradigms. It is unclear whether this lessens or increases the risk of rejection of its theories. Uninitiated
readers may be mystified by or suspicious of the abrupt
introduction of bargaining models.
In contrast, Weisiger clarifies and supports three
causal mechanisms—over optimism, domestic principal-agent problems, and commitment problems—to
explain war’s initiation, limitations (or lack thereof),
and ease of settlement. Overoptimistic wars are fought
because of