Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 93
BOOK REVIEWS
directives clearly. He was a man of conviction, and seldom became angry. He also had an introverted and unsociable side to his disposition. He rejected any attack,
criticism, or defamation directed at him and would
transfer the responsibility to others. His fixed ideas and
prejudices often distorted his judgment. However, as
the key individual responsible for the transformation of
Japan, “one finds no one who surpassed MacArthur in
dignity, knowledge, coordination, decision making, and
control.”
And, what of the general’s staff ? Masuda rates
Eisenhower (prewar), Sutherland, and Whitney
as his best officers. They all readily comprehended
MacArthur’s intentions and, perhaps more importantly, shared the ability to convert those into concrete
ideas, and communicate them effectively to others.
Lt. Col. Chris North, U.S. Army, Retired,
Afghanistan
AFTER LEANING TO ONE SIDE:
China and Its Allies in the Cold War
Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, Woodrow Wilson
Center and Stanford University Press, Washington
DC, 2011, 331 pages, $60.00
A
s the Cold War recedes into history, researchers
have growing access to the archives of various
participants. After several decades of research
and at least one period of imprisonment, historian Zhihua
Shen has obtained extensive records from both China and
the former Soviet Union. This has allowed him and his
wife, Danhui Li, to assemble an explanation of the tangled
relationships between the two leading Marxist regimes,
as well as Beijing’s troubled partnerships with North
Korea and North Vietnam. The resulting picture, while
still incomplete, helps Westerners better understand their
former adversaries.
A case in point is the 1950 Chinese intervention
in the Korean conflict, an intervention that inflicted a
serious, if temporary defeat upon the United States and
its allies. The traditional explanation for this intervention was that Beijing was responding to a perceived
threat as U.N. forces approached its borders after
defeating North Korea. More recently, revisionists such
as Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai have
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2014
argued that Mao Zedong was so angered by American
intervention in Asia that he concentrated troops on
the Yalu River even before the U.N. counteroffensive at
Inchon. Mao’s principal reasons for delaying his attack
thereafter were to obtain more Soviet military aid
and satisfy his critics within the Chinese government.
Professor Shen combines these two stories, suggesting that while Mao was inspired partly by a sense of
international solidarity with the Korean communists,
he sought to avoid direct conflict as long as possible.
Mao’s actual reasons for intervention were a complex
mixture of a perceived threat from the United States, a
desire to limit Soviet influence in the region, and a need
to convince Joseph Stalin of China’s loyalty. Once in the
war, China repeatedly disagreed with its North Korean
ally, and had to get Soviet diplomatic support to ensure
a unified military command and logistical system.
Additional chapters look at other issues of the Cold
War. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the 1953 armistice
agreement represented a diplomatic retreat by the
United States, not a communist concession in response
to the threat of nuclear attack. Throughout the 1950s,
the Soviet Union genuinely attempted to facilitate
China’s economic development, but according to Shen,
the Chinese broke off the relationship in 1960 because
Nikita Khrushchev was skeptical about the Chinese
communal system and Great Leap Forward. Finally, the
book provides the Chinese version of Richard Nixon’s
efforts to establish relations with Beijing. In this view,
Beijing was interested in improving U.S.-Chinese
relations for fear of conflict with Moscow, but refused
to assist or even recognize the American point of view
about negotiations to end the Vietnamese war.
The book is a collection of essays rather than a single
narrative, and as such is sometimes repetitious and
appears to jump back and forth in time. Moreover, the
authors present all their conclusions from the Chinese
viewpoint, which causes them to repeat impossible
claims of casualties inflicted on the United States as
well as distorted interpretations of American foreign
policy. Despite such minor irritations, however, After
Leaning to One Side is a further step in removing the
veils that have obscured communist actions during the
Cold War. The book also helps the reader understand
the history and perceptions of one of the most powerful
states in the current world scene.
Jonathan M. House, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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