Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 63

ARMY EXPERIMENTATION

Factors studied

Findings

Combat power of brigade
combat teams

Army 2020 force design updates increase the combat power of the brigade combat
team.

Operations at corps and
division

Army 2020 force design updates and legacy systems limit corps and division
commanders’ ability to control operational tempo and limit flexibility of assigning
missions to subordinate units.

Assets for division and below

Army 2020 force design updates result in critical shortfalls in the number of
surveillance, reconnaissance, military police, engineer, air and missile defense, network,
and intelligence assets available at division and below.

Low-density, high-value
assets

The vulnerability of low-density, high-value assets creates risk to the mission and the
force.

Skills for conducting major
combat operations

Basic skills required for the conduct of major combat operations have atrophied or are
nonresident.

Implementation of new
designs

Commanders must take into account the additional time, training, and integration
required by the Army 2020 force designs.

Air-ground interactions

The increase of air-ground interactions (such as fixed wing, rotary wing, unmanned
aerial vehicle, air defense artillery, rockets, mortar, and missiles) has created a complex
airspace coordination problem.

Command and control

Army 2020 force design updates increase command and control challenges and
require a greater understanding of battlefield systems.

Doctrine

Army 2020 will require updates to and clarification of doctrine.

Integration, coordination,
and synchronization of forces

Army 2020 increases the capability to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize assets at
corps and division.

Table 2. FY 2013 experimentation findings

• Fires.
• Sustainment design and support concept.
• Intelligence 2020 initiatives.
• Protection and maneuver support.
• Aviation.
• Medical.

The 2013 experimentation campaign was composed
of six events designed to address sequenced operational
activities including theater shaping, transition to combat, combat, and transition from combat to peacetime.
Each experiment evaluated organization design, organization performance, capabilities required to perform
tasks, and personnel skills executed across the joint
operational phases. Table 2 summarizes the FY 2013
experimentation findings.11
In a cooperative effort with 2nd Infantry Division,
aspects of Army 2020 were included in the division’s
Mission Command Training Program Warfighter
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014

exercise conducted in Korea in December 2013. This
provided an opportunity to “test drive” select Army
2020 initiatives in a real-world environment and captured subject matter expert feedback on Army 2020
operational and organizational concepts. This event examined operations in a certain set of conditions, within
an exercise environment that imposed a particular set
of constraints, limitations, and assumptions. Despite
these limitations, the event provided an essential operational perspective to augment experimentation results.
Both years of Army-level experimentation, followed
by a 2014 division-level operational assessment, yielded
very consistent results on the impact of future force
designs on the Army’s posture.12 These findings merit
deliberate consideration for future force design, development, and implementation.
Army 2020 designs generally performed as intended. However, it became clear that resiliency must be a
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