Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 44

maintaining consistent contact with soldiers who are
geographically dispersed across a state, without significantly increasing operational tempo. To meet this challenge, commanders and sergeant majors should consider
using technological tools to mentor junior leaders. One
technique is holding periodic telephone conference calls
or using Defense Connect Online sessions to target specific audiences (e.g., company commanders, squad leaders, or medics). Participants at a typical meeting could
discuss a preselected professional development topic,
emailed along with supporting material in advance.
Round-table discussion will increase lines of communication, foster a stronger relationship between the different levels of command, and expand professionalism.
Like it or not, the total force is under the public
microscope, and even Congress is irked at what it

sees.21 The good news is that this microscope can help
us identify and understand issues that need prompt
correction. We must not jeopardize our bond with
the American people. We must continue to hone our
professionalism each and every day.

Summary
The ARNG must sustain its ability to serve as an
operational force. It must do this by retaining combat-experienced soldiers and leaders, generating and
sustaining individual and unit readiness through
expert training management, forging partnerships at
every level and strengthening relationships, and
honing the professionalism of its soldiers and leaders.
By addressing each of these imperatives, the ARNG
will be able to achieve its strategic objectives.

Notes
1. See Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17,
“Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,”
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 29
October 2008); and National Guard Bureau white paper, “Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National
Guard,” 2011, https://g1arng.army.pentagon.mil/Featured%20
News/Attachments/ARFORGEN_Whitepaper_1AUG11.pdf.
2. See U.S. Army, A Statement on the Posture of the United
States Army 2013, submitted by John M. McHugh and Raymond T.
Odierno to the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 113th Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], May 2013), 5, http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.
net/e2/c/downloads/302970.pdf.
3. For more information on readiness ratings and unit status
reporting see Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration-Consolidated Policies, (Washington,
DC: GPO, 2010), http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/r220_1.pdf.
4. See John Garret, “Task Force Smith: The Lesson Never
Learned,” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College, 19 September 2000,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA381834.
5. See Charles R. Anderson, a brochure published by the U.S.
Army Center of Military History, CMH Pub 72-11, “Algeria-French
Morocco,” The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II series,
(Washington, DC: GPO, October 3, 2003), http://www.history.
army.mil/brochures/algeria/algeria.htm.
6. See Les’ Melnyk, Mobilizing for the Storm: the Army National
Guard In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Washington, DC:
National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, Historical Services
Division, 2001), 6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ng/desertstorm.pdf.

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7. The “Winograd Commission Report” refers to an Israeli
government-sponsored study originally published in Hebrew,
30 January 2008, cited in Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught
Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series
Occasional Paper 26 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office [GPO], 2008).
8. Ibid.
9. Thomas Freidman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used To
Be Us (New York: Picador, 2012).
10. For more about mentorship, see Army National Guard
Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, The Army National
Guard Leader Development Strategy, (Washington, DC: GPO, 6
November 2012), 10, www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/default.htm.
11. Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson, and
Aidan Kirby Winn, “Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict,”
Parameters, 40(1)(2010): 83.
12. For a discussio