Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 37

SUSTAINING THE ARNG

Notably, ARNG units will find it
difficult to obtain a higher level
of readiness without adequate
resources.
Throughout history nations
have let their military forces deteriorate for various reasons, later realizing the magnitude of their errors.
The infamous Task Force Smith—a
poorly prepared and ineffective U.S.
operation in South Korea in 1950—
remains a prime example of the
consequences of inadequate military preparedness.4 Many contemporary leaders have understood the
principles of readiness in pragmatic
terms. Former Secretary of Defense

MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014

Donald Rumsfeld (interviewed by
Ray Suarez, News Hour, PBS, 9
December 2004) famously stated,
“You go to war with the Army you
have. They’re not the Army you
might want or wish to have at a
later time.” When conflict begins,
military forces are not always ready.
In World War II, the U.S. Army
needed almost one year to prepare
before it engaged the enemy in
ground combat during Operation
Torch in North Africa and two and
a half years before it was ready to
execute D-Day.5
In Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, five ARNG brigades
were mobilized—three maneuver
brigades and two field artillery brigades.6 Why only the field artillery
brigades made it to the field of battle is debatable. However, the fact is
that when maneuver brigades first
were needed, they were not ready.
In 2008, the Israeli Winograd
Commission released a critical
review of Israel’s 2006 Lebanon
Campaign (sometimes known as the
Hezbollah-Israeli War).7 U.S. Army
historian Matt Matthews reports
that the commission’s analysis
attributed the Israeli Army’s poor
showing partly to inadequately
trained and equipped reserves.8 In
the Hezbollah-Israeli War, the Israeli
Army failed to degrade the operational effectiveness of Hezbollah.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
stated, “the war was a national
catastrophe and Israel suffered a
critical blow.” Considering the potential consequences, military units that
are not operationally ready have no
business being on the battlefield.
Flattening the ARFORGEN
cycle will not, by itself, help
the ARNG adapt to being an

Col. Thomas Zubik is an infantry officer in the U.S. Army Reserve and a
graduate of the Air War College. He
holds a B.A. in speech communication from Eastern Illinois University
and an M.S.W. from the University
of Illinois. He served on operational
deployments in Kosovo, Bosnia, and
Afghanistan.
Col. Paul C. Hastings, U.S. Army
National Guard, Retired, commanded
the 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat
Team, Illinois Army National Guard.
He has deployed to Europe, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. He holds a B.A. from
Texas A & M University and an M.A.
in strategic studies from the U.S. Army
War College.
Col. Michael J. Glisson, U.S. Army
National Guard, currently commands the 65th Troop Command
Brigade. He has deployed in support of
Operation Nobel Eagle and Operation
Enduring Freedom. He holds a B.F.A.
from Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale, and an M.A. in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War
College.

35